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1 Introduction
Logical anti-exceptionalism is the view that logical and scientific theories
are alike (Hjortland (2017)). From a philosophy of science perspective, this
means that the descriptive models of the processes of development and for-
mation of disagreements and agreements between different scientific theories
can be used to describe analogous processes among disputant logical theo-
ries. Therefore, given that different models are available in the philosophical
literature1, an important problem is to know what sort of model best repre-
sents agreement and disagreement among logical theories. In the following,
I explore this problem based on Laudan (1984) reticulated model of science.
Laudan’s reticulated model allows one to explore distinct commitments
carried by advocates of a scientific theory through the integration of method-
ological and factual elements of the theory. The processes of agreement and
disagreement formation are described through the dynamics of discovery of
new data, production of suitable heuristic mechanisms, and pursuit of se-
lected epistemic values. The resulting picture combines theoretical elements
treated by other philosophers of science such as Lakatos and Popper.
In the present paper, I depart from a representational conception of logical
theories, which considers not only the inferential apparatus, but also the
representational aims in view of their methodology and their epistemic goals.
This representational view draws from other approaches initiated by, for
instance, Thagard (1982), Aberdein and Read (2009), and Hjortland (2019).
However, whilst Aberdein and Read (2009) focus on the inferential aspects of
a logical theory, such as the revision of syntax and semantics of base logical
systems, the following approach focuses on the role of the logical data in
triggering different types of agreement and disagreement.
The upshot of the paper is a descriptive approach to logical theories
that fits Laudan’s reticulated model and shows how the very mode of rep-
resentation of the logical data is responsible for giving rise to specific forms
of methodological disagreements between logical theories. The underdeter-
mined character of logical data is shown to play a significant role in the pro-
1See e.g., Rosenberg (2011).
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liferation of distinct methodologies. Accordingly, data underdetermination
shall not be understood as a global phenomenon of empirically equivalent ev-
idence for rival theories, but rather as a local phenomenon of existing equally
plausible interpretations for a given set of data.
The paper is structured as follows: in Sections 2 and 3, I introduce two
different ways of looking at logical theories, namely as inferential devices and
as representational structures. I discuss how the latter view relates to logical
anti-exceptionalism and the advantages of this notion of logical theory. The
paper proceeds to Section 4, where the proposed conception of logical theory
is analyzed according to Laudan (1984) reticulated model of justification for
scientific theories. In Section 5 the problem of the underdetermination of
the logical data is explored in relation to the reticulated view on justifica-
tion. The underdetermined feature of logical data is illustrated in Section
6 through the case of paraconsistent theories and the debate over adequate
interpretations of the concept of contradictions. Different types of disagree-
ments are shown to play a significant role in the process of revision of distinct
paraconsistent theories. The paper continues to Section 7 by exploring dif-
ferent forms of pluralism arising from the reticulated view on the formation
of agreement and disagreement.
2 Logical theories as inferential devices
A logical theory is an inferential structure capable to determine which conse-
quences are valid in view of an underlying notion of logical consequence. In
rough terms, a logical theory is defined by the set of valid inferences relative
to a logical system and a set of basic sentences. Given a base logical system
L = 〈S,`〉, where S is a set of formulas and `⊆ ℘(S)× S is a consequence
relation, let the closure of a set of formulas Γ ⊆ S be Γ` = {α : Γ ` α}. A
logical theory T is defined as the following resulting structure:
T = 〈Γ,Γ`〉
Call the representation above the purely inferential view on logical the-
ories. From the fact that a logical theory is grounded on a logical system,
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the theory is said to be an expression of the conception of validity intrinsic
to the logical system. Hence every logical theory can be seen as a theory
of validity. They determine which inferences are valid in view of a suitable
consequence relation. Two logical theories disagree whenever one accepts
as valid an inference, say p, denied by the other. In such a case, a logical
disagreement is said to happen. As Hjortland (2019) put this, “an account
of logical theories should therefore reflect that there are rival theories that
disagree on the validity of arguments”.
In contemporary logic, logical disagreements are a common phenomenon
due to the proliferation of logical systems. But if so many different theories
of validity are available, a straightforward problem is to know when and how
to choose one among the many. The anti-exceptionalist2 offers an apparently
simple solution: assume logical theories are akin to scientific theories, then
a decision procedure can be employed just like it happens with the sciences.
Start by selecting a set of relevant data and measure the vices and virtues
of each logical theory, the best scoring ones ought to be chosen. In order
to perform this weighing procedure, the relevant criteria shall be those em-
ployed by the hard sciences: adequacy to the data, fruitfulness, simplicity,
consistency, elegance, and so on.
The anti-exceptionalist move seems harmless, but it comes with a price.
To say that logical and scientific theories are alike is to say they are both
fallible endeavors, which are subject to a process of revision through the
employment of formal tools in the description of a wide range of phenom-
ena. And if the content of logical theories is taken to bear non-aprioristic
features, it means that logical theories are also representational structures.
They model some form of data upon which they are also supposed to account
and explain. As a result, we move from a conception of logic as a theory of
deduction to a conception of logic-as-modelling, where now the inferential
apparatus ought to be tested against a specific kind of data3. Moreover, for
2See Hjortland (2017).
3Note one might still prefer only a theory of deduction in order to rule out any consid-
eration over the representational features of a logical theory. However, the present paper
shall focus on the representational aspects of logical theories. See Hjortland (2019) for the
difference between logic as a theory of deduction and logic-as-models.
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a phenomenon to be described by a logical theory, the inferential appara-
tus does not seem to suffice in order to decide which theory stands as the
most adequate. Representational features related to the relevant domain of
application, to how to best represent it, and to how the data ought to be
accounted for, shall play a significant role in this.
Consider the logical dispute between classical and intuitionistic theories.
It is well known that the core of this debate is centered around the unre-
stricted validity of the law of excluded middle in classical theories4. If we
compare them from an inferential perspective by analyzing virtues such as
strength and simplicity, it is clear that classical theories have a head start on
intuitionistic theories. However, once we select a specific domain of applica-
tion, namely of constructive sets and proofs, the epistemic virtues selected
by the intuitionist such as constructiveness and effectiveness shall start to
balance the scale for intuitionistic theories. Soon, the disputants shall need
to make explicit the reasons why one’s epistemic aims are better than others,
and their philosophical commitments will surface the discussion.
When comparing logical theories on purely inferential grounds, repre-
sentational aspects such as the epistemic aims of the theory, the methods
for exploring the selected data and the intended domain of application are
often neglected. Accordingly, an important methodological aspect adopted
throughout the present paper is to propose and explore a broader conception
of logical theory that is able to articulate inferential and representational
elements within the process of revision of a logical theory. To explore the
relation between inferential and representational elements is to make explicit
underlying methodological and philosophical commitments.
To evaluate logical theories in view of their representational capacities
allows their treatment as dynamical structures sensitive to revisional pro-
cesses. The epistemic goals and the philosophical commitments of the theory
are both put into play, and not treated as extra-logical elements orthogonal
to the deductive apparatus. Considerations over the heuristic mechanisms,
methods and constraints that guide the development of the theory are as-
sumed to play an important role. From this perspective, logical theories are
4The law of excluded middle [LEM] amounts to ` A ∨ ¬A, for every A ∈ S.
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understood as structures within research programs to mine distinct domains
of logical data. Naturally, an important problem is to know what should
count as logical data. For this I shall follow the anti-exceptionalist move of
considering a wide range of phenomena, from mathematical constructions to
natural language phenomena, to be coherent with the common practice in
the logic literature.
3 Logical theories as representational struc-
tures
Now, in order to consider representational features of a logical theory, the
purely inferential conception needs to be further qualified. These represen-
tational features are often described as mechanisms to achieve the deductive
goal of the system. Thus, many elements may be considered, like the in-
tended semantics of the base system, its metatheory, or even types of deduc-
tive mechanisms. However, in order to focus only at the modelling features
of a logical theory, I shall focus on two main aspects: the relevant data to
be accounted for, and the methodological grounds for exploring the relevant
data. For this, I shall call the representational apparatus of a logical
theory the following structure:
RT = 〈 methodology, inferential goal 〉,
where T is a logical theory. The methodology of a logical theory shall be called
any set of formal and philosophical constraints developed within a research
program to achieve the inferential goal of the theory5. The role of the infer-
ential goal is to prescribe what the inferential practice is intended to achieve
and what criterion plays a role in delimiting valid from invalid inferences.
The most common example is the preservation of truth, but many logical
theories require additional constraints to the validity of arguments, such as
5The methodology of a logical theory can be understood as analogous to Lakatos (1978)
conception of methodologies for scientific research. However, the heuristic mechanisms
developed for the logical theory are tied to the inferential and epistemic goals of the
theory.
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relevance, preservation of warrant, non-triviality in face of inconsistencies,
and others alike (Aberdein and Read (2009)).
In the process of development of a logical theory the inferential goal is of-
ten established as a reaction to some anomalous data to the reference theory.
The deviant logical theory ought to promote a new inferential goal capable
to accommodate (or reject) the anomalous data. In this process the infer-
ential goal determines the epistemic goals of the deviant theory motivated
by the selection of a relevant set of data. Thereafter the methodology shall
start to develop a set of constraints for the adequate exploration of the data.
For example, the methodology may establish that the relevant data shall
be treated as a semantic phenomenon of natural language, and for this a
non-distributive conjunction must be taken as a minimal requirement for its
adequate description. Soon adequate syntactical and semantical constraints
ought to be defined in order to produce logical systems in accordance with
all the restrictions chosen by the methodology. As a result, the representa-
tional apparatus of the deviant theory becomes responsible for guiding the
development of suitable inferential tools.
Four elements shall be assumed to play a key role in the dynamical char-
acter of logical theory revision: 1) the logical systems, 2) their semantics, 3)
the methodology, and 4) the inferential goal. Based on this, a descriptive
conception of a logical theory may be introduced as:
Td = 〈 logical system, semantics, methodology, inferential
goal 〉,
From the descriptive point of view, it is easy to see that revising the
logic and revising the theory should not be conflated. Whereas the revision
of the logic occurs in the base system and its underlying notion of validity,
the revision of the theory may occur at other elements. This paper also
distinguishes between revision and deviation: the former shall be understood
as internal changes to logical theories, while the latter as the inferential
departure from the reference theory (here assumed to be classical logic).
Deviation, then, may be expressed as a disagreement over the inferential
goal. However, logical theories may diverge by considerations on any of the
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abovementioned four elements.
In Aberdein and Read (2009), the authors explore many sources of diver-
gence resulting from elements (1) and (2) above. In the present paper, I shall
explore types of divergence related to elements (3) and (4) only. For this, the
ubiquitous nature of the logical data shall play a key role in the process of
revision of a logical theory. In this setting, logical revision is understood as
the many adaptations a logical theory may suffer in the effort to adequately
describe a relevant set of data. The process of logical theory revision is un-
derstood as the struggle to produce adequate inferential and representational
tools to model a relevant phenomenon6.
4 A bird’s eye view: insights from Laudan
In the philosophy of science, an influential model for description of the pro-
cess of formation of agreement and disagreement between scientific theories
was proposed by Laudan (1984) in response to some irrationalist threats per-
petrated by Kuhn and to the hierarchical view of the process of justification
of scientific theories. Laudan’s model, called reticulated model of justi-
fication, is based on the idea that scientific theories may disagree at three
distinct levels: factual, methodological, and axiological.
At the factual level there are all types of claims about reality, “including
claims about theoretical or unobservable entities”7. Debates of this sort are
called factual disagreements, and agreements of this sort are called factual
agreements. Factual disagreements involve not only debates about the truth
or falsity of certain claims, but also about the relevant data to be explained
and the facts to be accounted for. According to the reticulated model, fac-
tual disagreements can be settled at the previous level, the methodological
level. In its turn, the methodological level is determined by considerations
over what are the best procedures to explore and explain the data at hand,
where these methodological choices are guided and influenced by considera-
6See, e.g., Blake-Turner and Russell (2018) for a similar account of the representational
character of logical theories.
7(Laudan, 1984, pg. 23).
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tions from the preceding level, the axiological level. In Laudan’s terms, the
axiological level may be described as the set of cognitive/epistemic goals es-
tablished by the theory, e.g. simplicity, adequacy to the data, consistency,
and so on. Given an agreement over a set of epistemic goals, the relation
between the methods and the axiology may be described in terms of condi-
tionals of the kind: “If one wants to accomplish such and such cognitive goal,
then she ought to act according to such and such methods”.
In Laudan’s reticulated model, the process of agreement and disagreement
occurs back-and-forth among all different levels. New intuitions about the
data may lead to revisions at the axiological level. Thereafter new method-
ological constraints might be considered in order to perform the new goals
determined by the axiological level. Similarly, new intuitions about the cog-
nitive goals might lead to revisions at the factual level through novel consid-
erations about the relevant data. As acknowledged by (Laudan, 1984, p. 35):
“(...) cognitive [epistemic] aims typically underdetermine methodological
rules in precisely the same way that methodological rules characteristically
underdetermine factual choices.” This intertwined feature across all levels
leads to several types of adjustments relative to each level. Thus, scien-
tific theory revision is the result of looking for an equilibrium state among
the three different levels motivated by a constants process of agreement and
disagreement formation at each level.
Back to logical theories, the reticulated view on justification provides an
assessment of the relation among the distinct elements of the descriptive
conception of logical theories. Among the factual disagreements, there are
disagreements about the logical data at hand. As discussed before, deviance
from the reference theory is motivated by an inferential disagreement due
to allegedly anomalous data. Such inferential disagreement is taken to re-
flect an incompatibility among the epistemic goals of the disputant theories.
Therefore, the inferential disagreement between rival theories is understood
as resulting from both an axiological dispute over adequate epistemic goals,
and from a factual dispute over the relevant set of data. From this, a new
inferential goal to handle anomalous data is required from the deviant the-
ory. Naturally, after the establishment of a new inferential goal, a set of
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methodological constraints will be adapted for the logical theory at stake.
The intertwined character across the elements of a logical theory is present
in the processes of revision and deviation. Disputes over the adequate data
may lead to disputes over the adequate inferential goal. Conversely, consid-
erations over the inferential goal may lead to methodological disputes over
the adequate manner to represent the selected data. In the same way, new
intuitions over the data may lead to novel refinements of the inferential goal.
As analogous to the reticulated model, the back-and-forth process of revision
of a logical theory is fed by the pursuit of an adequate representation of a
relevant phenomenon with the most suitable inferential tools.
The resulting picture agrees with the reticulated model in the following
way:
Levels of Disagreement Logical theory
C. Factual Data
B. Methodological Meth. constraints
A. Axiological Inferential goal
A B
C
As exhibited in the picture above, the reticulated view accommodates
different types of disagreement. Even if a deviant logical theory diverges
from the reference theory due to the validity of a certain inference, say the
idempotence of conjunction, partisans of the deviant theory may still as
well disagree over factual and methodological issues. Whereas one group
might prefer to understand the relevant logical data as representing epistemic
situations and to produce logical systems with a truth-functional semantics,
another group might prefer exploring an ontological conception of the logical
data, guided by a methodology that privileges non-truth-functional adequate
logical systems.
As an example, think of the case of paraconsistent theories. Once the
inferential goal of rejecting triviality in face of contradiction is established,
the methodology ought to determine specific constraints in order to produce
adequate logical systems, such as the presence of a non-explosive negation,
or a non-adjunctive conjunction, and so on. The different ways to achieve
10
the epistemic goal proliferate distinct methodologies and research traditions
around the shared goal. As mentioned, however, even if paraconsistentists
do agree over the inferential goal, they might still disagree over factual and
methodological matters. In the following, I discuss how these distinct types
of disagreements are triggered by the very nature of the logical data.
5 The role of the logical data
In science, the revision of a theory may occur by the discovery and exploration
of anomalous data that do not fit within the reference theory, as well as by
extra-empirical reasons discovered in the process of solving problems that are
internal to the theory in order to enhance virtues such as scope, coherence,
explanatory power, or applicability8. In a similar manner, revisions and
deviations of classical logic were suggested as the outcome of different kinds
of disagreements resulting from the applicability of the inferential apparatus
to distinct domains, as well as from the will to extend the scope of application
of classical principles.
In the logic literature, different cases for deviance and revision were pre-
sented. Paraconsistent logicians called for the revision of the principle of
explosion due to the discovery of semantic and set-theoretic paradoxes; quan-
tum logicians called for the revision of the law of distributivity in reaction
to the empirical discoveries of quantum mechanics; intuitionistic logicians
called for the revision of the law of excluded middle on account of concerns
with the constructive character of mathematical reasoning; plural logicians
called for adequate expressive power to formalize plural quantification as in
natural language, and others alike. The defenders of each of those positions
shared at least one common purpose, i.e. to revise some underlying feature
of classical logic by either disputing the validity of a certain inference or by
extending its deductive strength.
Whereas some of these arguments attacked the inadequacy of classical
logic to describe some empirical phenomena, others appealed to some infer-
8See Laudan (1978).
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ences that seemed not in accordance with our day-to-day practices, or even
against the metaphysical picture implied by some classical principles. There-
fore, our revisionary practices seem to follow the rationalist tenets according
to which the reference theory ought to be subject to critical examination
and put to the test of a wide range of phenomena. This seems to be in line
with Hjortland’s intuition about what types of logical data are acceptable
for anti-exceptionalist purposes:
“The evidence for a logical theory can come from a number of
different sources: from intuitions about validity or alethic modal-
ity, from mathematical theories and practice, from psychology of
reasoning, from epistemic norms of rationality, and so on” Hjort-
land (2017)
From Hjortland’s description one may note that logical data may be as-
sumed to spring from observational and non-observational sources. This
ubiquitous character of logical data gives logical inferences a high degree of
verifiability for it makes them susceptible to different interpretations of what
sort of data they bear on. As a result, the underdetermination of the logical
data leads to equivocal interpretations of the logical inferences in dispute.
Whereas an attacker of a logical principle may provide epistemic situations
as evidence against its validity, others may present as diverse phenomena as
mathematical constructions, physical events, semantical constructions, infor-
mational processes, etc9. Different views of classical logic seem to result from
this, namely of:
• Classical logic as a set of descriptions of linguistic phenomena.
This form of revision is motivated by interpreting classical validities as
reflecting linguistic structures. Therefore, linguistic data are provided
as anomalies to the principle in dispute.
• Classical logic as a set of rationality principles. In this kind
of revision, the opponent does not agree with how classical principles
9See Haack (1974).
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model a certain inferential situation. Logical principles are taken to
be rules of procedure that guide agents through different inferential
situations. Accordingly, epistemic situations are provided as anomalous
data to the principle in dispute.
• Classical logic as a set of metaphysical truths. In this kind
of revision, the opponent attacks some metaphysical presupposition
implied by the principle under revision. Logical principles are hence
taken to be metaphysical principles and therefore to characterize some
fundamental structures of reality.
All positions above result from distinct perspectives over the content of
classical principles and what type of domain they ought to describe. If de-
viations begin with the exploration of anomalous data, in order to develop
coherent guiding principles, the methodology of the new theory has to answer
the following two questions about the nature of the logical data at hand: 1)
What domain of our experience does the data represent?; and 2) What prin-
ciples of the reference logical theory does the logical data conflicts with? The
answer to these questions is the key for establishing how the deviant logical
theory interprets the content of the reference theory. In the following, I ex-
plore the case of paraconsistent logics in order to analyze how these different
views of classical principles lead to different methodologies. The underde-
termined character of logical data is exhibited through how methodological
disputes emerge around paraconsistent theories.
6 Paraconsistency and kinds of disagreement
The birth of paraconsistent logics is marked by the discovery of new logical
data stemming from mathematical and semantical theories. The discovery of
paradoxes, semantical and set-theoretical, provoked the concern with the de-
velopment of alternative ways to handle inconsistent theories without falling
into triviality10. As a result, this sort of phenomena led to a general dissatis-
10See Da Costa et al. (1995) and Priest (2002).
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faction with the principle of explosion (PE) and the methodological attitude
induced by the classical logician in face of contradictions11.
The cornerstone of the methodology of paraconsistent logics was devel-
oped around the requirement of preventing the explosive behavior of classical
negation. The variety of techniques developed to meet such a requirement
blossomed into the high number of paraconsistent logics available in the liter-
ature, labelled into distinct categories and methodological traditions. How-
ever, from the fact that paraconsistentists share the same inferential goal,
namely avoiding triviality in face of contradictions, one cannot conclude that
they all share the same methodological and factual beliefs. An important
point of contention among paraconsistentists occurs at the factual level of
paraconsistent theories, with side-effects on their methodology. These dis-
putes are relative to the nature of contradictions, to what kind of items con-
tradictions are, as well as to what sort of explanatory power they provide to
paraconsistent theories. Whereas some paraconsistentists (like Mares (2004))
regard contradictions as a mere semantic or linguistic phenomenon with low
explanatory power to our theories of reality, others (like Priest (2006)) take
them to reflect ontological features of the world.
As discussed in Section 4, according to the reticulated model, new in-
sights over the epistemic goals might be motivated by novel insights at the
factual level. This means that distinct forms of looking at the data may lead
to new intuitions about how to understand the epistemic aims of the theory.
In the case of logical theories, the same process of revision happens by dis-
covering new ways of interpreting the inferential goal of the theory in light
of novel insights about the data under consideration. Accordingly, new in-
sights over how to adequately interpret the inferential goal of the theory may
lead to different interpretations of the logical vocabulary. As examples, in
Wansing and Odintsov (2016) the authors defend information as the relevant
data for paraconsistent theories so that paraconsistency can be motivated
independently of epistemological or metaphysical commitments. According
to this view, negation is understood as an operation of cancellation, and the
11The principle of explosion (or of ex contradictione quodlibet) states that every formula
follows from a contradiction, i.e. ¬A,A ` B.
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failure of PE is explained by assuming that from the information of A and
¬A, one cannot infer any information about B. In an analogous manner,
Carnielli and Rodrigues (2012); Carnielli and Rodrigues (2019) argue for
the view that contradictions have only an epistemic character, and that they
cannot be taken as space-time phenomena, nor as mathematical objects. In
their Evidence-LFIs systems, evidence is assumed to be the relevant data for
paraconsistent theories and the failure of PE is motivated by the idea that
non-explosive contradictions denote only conflicting non-conclusive evidence.
The selection of the relevant data is then accompanied by an interpre-
tation of the principle in dispute with the reference theory. In the case
of the rivalry between paraconsistent and classical theories, four different
views on inconsistencies may be distinguished: epistemic (Carnielli and Ro-
drigues (2019)), semantic (Priest (2014) and Mares (2004)), ontological
(Priest (2006)), and informational (Wansing and Odintsov (2016))12. The
interpretation of inconsistencies for epistemic purposes is motivated by com-
prehending classical logic as a set of rationality principles that are useful
to organize collections of knowledge and evidence in the process of scien-
tific investigation. In this case PE is understood as a prohibition to accept
contradictory evidence, and negation is read in terms of incompatibility. Au-
thors who favor the epistemic view usually weigh the explanatory power of
paraconsistent theories through the description of epistemic faculties such as
knowledge, evidence, justification, belief, and others13.
The informational perspective on contradictions is also similar to the
epistemic one, but in the sense of Wansing and Odintsov (2016) it has the
purpose of ruling out considerations about epistemic agents. As explained
by the authors:
With the conception of logic as the theory of valid inferences
and the conception of logics as consequence relations, logic, by
12Note these views on contradictions might still be applied to other authors such as
Routley (1980) and Batens (1999).
13In fact, Carnielli and Rodrigues (2019) also motivate their reading of the data in
terms of information, but still regard justification as the relevant item for the failure of
PE.
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definition, is committed to the existence of languages but not
necessarily to the existance of language users.(...) Moreover, the
notion of valid inference does not refer to the knowledge or be-
lief states of any epistemic or doxastic subjects. (Wansing and
Odintsov, 2016, p.180)
In a different manner, the view on contradictions as semantic items is
motivated by an interpretation of classical logic as a set of descriptions for
linguistic phenomena. For this view inconsistencies arise due to the vague-
ness of certain concepts. Classical logic is seen as a faulty description of
our linguistic practices. Examples of a semantic view on contradictions are
provided by Mares (2004) and Priest (2014) through overlapping linguistic
concepts. Lastly, the ontological view is characterized by taking inconsisten-
cies to represent aspects of reality. Classical logic is understood as a set of
metaphysical truths, and the paraconsistentist fights PE as a consequence of
challenging the law of non-contradiction as a metaphysical principle14 .
Principle Data Interpretation
Informational “From the information of A and ¬A one can infer information about B”
A,¬A ` B Epistemic “One cannot hold contradictory evidence without falling into triviality”
Ontological “Reality cannot comprise contradictory items”
Semantic “Language cannot hold contradictory concepts”
Table 1: Different views on contradictions
The resulting views are summarized in Table 115. It shows how the in-
ferential disagreement over the validity of the principle of explosion may be
motivated by different specifications of the logical data. The content of PE
is made precise in different ways by exploring distinct kinds of data. As a
result, distinct interpretations over the inferential goal of rejecting PE bring
about different methodologies for the development of suitable logical systems.
For each kind of data at stake, different tools shall be developed in order to
avoid the unrestricted validity of PE16. Whereas the informational reading of
14For an interpretation of the law of non-contradiction as a metaphysical principle, see
Tahko (2009).
15One may also use the term ‘should not’ instead of ‘cannot’.
16Note that even if different methodological constraints spread into different systems,
they might still overlap.
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PE may avoid its validity through constraints of relevance, the semantic and
epistemic readings may avoid its validity through exploring weaker notions
of incompatibility.
The different ways of coping with the data lead paraconsistent theories to
incur in a methodological underdetermination of their theories by the avail-
able evidence. Underdetermination is understood in this context as a local
phenomenon due to the existence of equally plausible interpretations of the
selected evidence17. As we shall discuss, this type of underdetermination
leads to axiological disagreements about whether there is one correct method-
ology for the development of paraconsistent theories. To state the existence
of one correct methodology is to defend the existence of one correct way of
interpreting the relevant data, as well as one better set of constraints for the
development of suitable logical systems.
To sum up, the representational view on logical theories is coherent with
the reticulated dynamics according to which inferential agreements might be
attached to matters of how and what is being represented. The underdeter-
mined character of the logical data leads to important disagreements for the
methodology of logical theories. A similar sort of data underdetermination
also arise in the debate about vagueness. The offered solutions to the body
of evidence leads to equally plausible and dual interpretations, such as the
subvaluationist and supervaluationist solutions. Whereas the former inter-
prets vague statements as truth-value gluts, supervaluationists takes vague
statements to represent truth-value gaps. Therefore, the different ways of
interpreting the data give rise to distinct methodological choices. Hence,
distinct traditions emerge as the result of methodological disputes over the
adequate manner of exploring the relevant data.
In the following section, I discuss how the different levels of agreement
and disagreement leave room for distinct forms of pluralism. These types of
pluralism, naturally, are not related to inferential debates over consequence
relations, but rather to normative views over adequate constraints for logical
17Methodological underdetermination is understood here as a type of contrastive un-
derdetermination relative to the methodology at play. Contrastive underdetermination
states that for any body of evidence confirming a given hypothesis there might be other
hypotheses explaining the same phenomenon. See Stanford (2017).
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theories. They are straightforward consequences of the fact that the retic-
ulated view describes not only factual debates about the truth or falsity of
certain claims, but also debates over representational issues.
7 Beyond inferential pluralism
As discussed in the previous sections, the reticulated model expresses the
idea that different types of debate take place between the defenders of dis-
tinct scientific theories. In the case of logic, the relevant debate is not only
relative to the truth or falsity of factual claims, but also to debates about
the methodological tools, the epistemic goals of the theory, as well as the
relevant sets of data.
According to the reticulated view, the existence of agreements between
different logical theories about inferential or factual claims does not imply
the peaceful coexistence of these theories. Therefore, even if different log-
ical systems agree at the inferential level on the validity of the Tarskian
metaproperties of their consequence relations, as suggested by Beall and Re-
stall (2006), they can still dispute at the methodological or the factual level.
If the logical pluralism debate is characterized by a disagreement relative to
our inferential views on logical consequence, then two other types of norma-
tive debates seem to result in accordance with the reticulated view, namely:
the debate over the adequate methodological constraints relative to a suit-
able inferential view, and the debate over the relevant set of data for logical
theories. The former may be summarized by the following positions:
• Methodological pluralism: Different methodologies lead to different
perspectives and explanations over the same set of data. The prolifera-
tion of methodologies is a positive phenomenon, for it represents ways
of exploring and explaining the same set of relevant explanans chosen
by the inferential goal. Examples of methodological pluralists are para-
consistentists like Da Costa et al. (2007) or Batens (2017), for which
there is no best set of constraints to produce paraconsistent systems.
The pluralist attitude of this position is also marked by the inclination
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to accept the use of classical concepts at the metalanguage level, as
well as by the will to explore distinct domains of data.
• Methodological monism: There is only one correct methodology for
exploring a given set of data. This one best methodology is usually
tied to a fixed interpretation of the relevant logical data. In Wansing
and Odintsov (2016) the authors defend a monist perspective over the
methodology of paraconsistent logic, according to which paraconsistent
systems ought to be produced by accepting the notion of information
as the relevant data along with the rejection of classical logic as the
reference logic for paraconsistent theories.
Another type of pluralism coherent with the reticulated model concerns
factual disagreements over the acceptable sources of data for logical theories.
Here the relevant content for logical principles plays a key role in defining
the adequate domain of application of the theory and the role of the logical
system as a foundation for it. The debate may be described by the following
positions:
• Data source pluralism: Data for logical theories may come from
different sources. Logical theories then ought to be foundational to
diverse domains of knowledge. This view is shared for instance by
Routley (1980). It is important to highlight that even though Routley
is in favor of a form of data source pluralism, he is an inferential monist
that also supports a forma of methodological monism with respect to
paraconsistent theories. Routley’s position results from a defense of
his ultralogic as the true logic for foundations across all domains of
knowledge.
• Data source monism: There is only a single class of relevant data
for logical theories. The common examples are the data coming from
mathematical theories, from our theories of truth, or from our linguistic
practices. For data monists logical theories ought to be foundational
to a specific research activity, be it mathematics, linguistics, etc.
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8 Conclusion
In the present paper, I have explored how the representational anti-exceptionalist
account of logical theories fits Laudan’s reticulated view of scientific agree-
ment and disagreement. The underdetermined nature of logical evidence was
shown to play a significant role in the process of revision and deviation of
logical theories. In the process of revision, logical evidence is responsible
for allowing the proliferation of distinct methodologies that drive the deve-
lopment of logical theories. On the other hand, in the process of deviation,
logical evidence is responsible for allowing different interpretations of the
principles in dispute. Logical theory revision is understood through the dy-
namics of the adequate representation of some kind of data in accordance
with suitable methodological tools. The resulting picture is coherent with a
view in which each logical tradition is developed in pursuit of some selected
epistemic goals.
Some topics remain open for further exploration, such as how to charac-
terize deep disagreements in view of the reticulated model, what other types
of non-classical theories could be described through the underdetermination
of the data, as well as how to characterize the type of logical pluralism in
accordance with Laudan’s own philosophical views.
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